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Case and Comment
DEGLMAN v. GUARANTY TRU ST CO. OF CANADA 
AND CONSTANTINEAU.1 
Contracts — Restitution — Unjust Enrichment — Recovery for 
Services Performed under Unenforceable Oral Contract
In the Deglman case, the Supreme Court had to decide whether to 
recognize a doctrine of unjust enrichment in Canada. The facts 
briefly stated were these: The deceased, the aunt of the respondent, was 
alleged to have agreed that if the respondent would be good to her 
and do such services for her as she might from time to time request 
during her life-time she would make adequate provision for him in her 
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aunt in her own or in his automobile on trips to Montreal and else­
where, and on other pleasure drives, of doing odd jobs about two 
houses owned bv the aunt including the one which was to pass to the 
respondent on her death, and of various services such as errands for 
her personal needs.
One question was whether the acts done constituted part per­
formance of an oral contract relating to land so as to take the ease 
out of section 4 of the Ontario Statute of Frauds.- Both the trial judge 
and the Court of Appeal held that they did, but were reversed on this 
point by the Supreme Court. However, this note is not concerned with 
the doctrine of part performance, but with unjust enrichment or 
restitution.
The respondent could not recover on the express oral contract 
because of tne Statute of Frauds. The Supreme Court was also of 
the opinion that logically he should not be permitted to rccovcr on 
an inconsistent implied contract,3 and disagreed with the rationale of 
Scott v. Pattison4 where the plaintiff served the defendant under a 
contract for servicc not to be performed within one year, but was held 
entitled, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, to sue on an implied 
contract to pay him according to his deserts. 'I lie  soundness of the 
principle of this decision had previously been doubted.
The only remaining basis for granting the plaintiff a remcdv was 
an obligation imposed directly by law on the administrator of the dc-
1. [19541 3 D.L.R. 785.
2. R S O.. 1950. c. 371.
3. In C utter v. Pow ell. 101 ER 573, Lord Kenyon said: “That where the parties have 
come to an express contract none can be implied, has prevailed so long as to be 
reduced to an axiom of law” ; and in B rita in  v. Rossiter, 11 Q B.D. 123, Brett L.J. 
said at p. 127: “It is a proposition which cannot be disputed that no new contract can 
be implied from acts done under an express contract which is still subsisting; all 
that can be said is that no one can be charged upon the original contract because 
it is not in writing.”
4. 119231 2 K B. 723.
performance consisted of taking his
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ccascd to prevent unjust enrichment. In England there is division of 
opinion 01 1  the availability of such a remedy.
Some English judges have supported the view of Lord Mansfield 
in Moses v. Macferlan* where his lordship based the action for money 
had and received on natural justice.® Thus in Brook’s W harf and Bull 
W harf Ltd. v. Goodman Bros.,7 A had been compelled to pav to B 
money which C was legally bound to pay B, and A claimed repayment 
from C. This had long been a well-rcfcognized quasi-contractual obliga­
tion and Lord W right, M .R., based it on the ‘unjust benefit’ which 
would accruc to C if lie did not repay, and denied that the duty is 
founded on an implied contract.8 Again in the Fibrosa case,” Lord 
W right thought that “any civilized system of law is bound to provide 
remedies for eases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust 
benefit.” In his lordship’s opinion, the basis of quasi-con tractual 
liability was not to be found in contract or in tort but within a third 
category of the common law.10
In Nelson v. Larholt,11 Denning }. (as he then was) supported Lord 
Mansfield’s view in somewhat the same language as Lord W righ t.12 
His Lordship’s opinion was that the principle of unjust enrichment had 
been evolved by the courts of law and equity side by side. “In equity,” 
lie said, “it took the form of an action to follow money impressed 
with an express trust or with a constructive trust owing to a fiduciary 
relationship. In law it took the form of an action for money had and 
received or damages for conversion of a cheque.”13 He went on to say, 
“It is no longer appropriate, however, to draw a distinction between 
law and equity. Principles have now to be stated in the light of their 
combined effects.” And in Reading v. Att. Gen.,14 where a soldier 
derived benefit from wearing his uniform to assist another in illegal 
activity, he was held answerable to the Crown for the monev he re­
ceived for this service. At the trial Denning J. said that “the master’s 
claim in these cases does not rest in contract or in tort, but in the third 
category known as restitution.”13 Again in Larner v. London County
5. 97 E.R. 681
6. “If the defendant be under an obligation fvom the ties of natural justice, to refund; 
the law implies a debt and gives this action (sc. Indeb itatus assum psit) founded in 
the equity of the plaintiff’s case, *3 it were, upon a contract (quasi ex contractu  as 
the Roman law expresses iti . . . ‘In one word, the gist of this kind of action is. 
that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of 
natural justice and equity to refund the money’.” Ibid. p. 681.
7. (19371 1 K B  534
8. “These statements of the principle do not put the obligation on any ground of 
implied contract or of constructive or notional contract. The obligation is imposed 
by the Court simply under the circumstances of the case and on what the Court 
decides is just and reasonable, having regard to the relationshio of the parties. It 
is a debt or obligation constituted by the act of the law apart from any consent or 
intention of the parties or any privity of contract.” Ibid, p 545
9. [19431 A.C. 32.
10. "Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract 
or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common 
law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.” Ibid, p. 61.
11. [1948] 1 K.B. 339
12. Ib id , p. 343: “The right here is not peculiar to equity or contract or tort, but falls 
naturally within the important category of cases where the court orders restitution  
if the justice of the case so requires.”
13. Ibid . p. 343
14. (19481 2 K.B. 268.
15. Ib id . p. 275.
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Council,10 where the council owing to a mistake of fact paid one of the 
men more than he was entitled to under the promise, Lord Justice 
Denning recognized that there was no contractual claim, but thought 
that the Council should be entitled to recover and that the plaintiff 
was ‘bound’ to repay the excess. This was termed by Cheshire and 
Fifoot, “an attempt to introduce a hybrid obligation, half-way between 
law and moralitv.”17
The Sale of Goods Act1* has provided that where the claim is for 
necessaries supplied to an infant, lunuatic or drunkard he must pay a 
reasonable price. Cotton L.J. said in Re Rhodes'9 that the term implied 
contract was an unfortunate expression in cases under this section20. The 
term implied contract, he said had been used to denote “not only a 
genuine contract established by inference, but also an obligation which 
does not arise from anv real contract, but which can be enforced as if 
it has a contractual origin.” To the same effect, Fletcher Moulton L.J. in 
Nash v. Inman, a case relating to infants, said that “an infant, like a 
lunuatic, is incapable of making a contract of purchase . . . The conse­
quence is that the basis of the action is hardly contract. Its real founda­
tion is an obligation which the law imposes on the infant to make a fair 
pavment in respect of needs satisfied. In other words the obligation 
arises ‘re’ and not ‘consensu’.”-1
Lord Sumner on the other hand regarded implied contract as the 
true basis of quasi-contract. In Sinclair v. Brougham-2 he denied the 
existence of a principle of unjust enrichment. “There is now 1 1 0  ground 
left”, he said,23 “for suggesting as a recognizable ‘equity’ the right to 
recover money in personam merely because it would be the right and 
fair thing that it should be refunded to the payer.”24 Lord Russell in 
the Fibrosa case was also of opinion that the notion of implied contract 
as the basis of quasi-contract was firmly embedded in the law of England 
and was not to be replaced by a more flexible doctrine of unjust enrich­
ment. 11 is lordship said, that “in Scotland the consequence of frustration 
is not that loss lies where it falls. The Scots law derives from the Roman
16. 119491 1 All E.R 964.
17. Law of Contracts i3rd ed.i at p. 526.
18. R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 199. s3. (It: “Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the gen­
eral law concerning capacity to contract, and to transfer and acquire property: 
provided that where necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant, or minor, or 
to a person who by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to 
contract, he must pay a reasonable price therefor.”
19. 11890] 44 Ch. D. 94.
20. Ibid, p. 105: "It is asked, can there be an implied contract by a person who cannot 
himself contract in express terms? The answer is. that what the law implies on the 
part of such a person is an obligation, which has been improperly termed a con­
tract, to repay money spent in supplying necessaries.”
21. 11908 1 2 K.B. 1, at p. 8.
22. 119141 A C. 398
23. Ibid. p. 456.
24 Lord Wright pointed out in the Fibrosa case at page 64 that Lord Sum ner’s obser­
vations in S in c la ir  v. B rougham  were obiter d icta and added: ‘‘Serious legal w riters 
have seemed to say that these words of tne great judge in S in c la ir  v. B rougham  
closed the door to any theory of unjust enrichment in English law. I do not 
understand why or how. It would indeed be a ‘reductlo ad absu rdum ” of the 
doctrine of precedents. In fact, the common law still employs the action for money 
had and received as a practical and useful, if not complete or ideally perfect, instru­
ment to prevent unjust enrichment, aided by the various methods of technical 
equity, which are also available as they were found to be in S in c la ir  v. B rougham .”
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law a different view, founded on the doctrine of ‘restitutio’, which has 
no placc in English law.”25
W hen the Reading ease was appealed to the House of Lords,26 Lord 
Porter disagreed with Denning J. on unjust enrichment. “The exact 
status of the law of unjust enrichment is not assured,” he said, “it holds 
a predominant place in the law of Scotland and I think in the United 
States, but I am content for the purposes of this case to accept the 
view that it forms no part of the law of England and that a right to 
restitution so described would be too widely stated.”27
It seems then that the implied contract theory is still prevalent in 
England,28 subject to strong adverse dicta. However in the Deglman 
case the Supreme Court of Canada, recognizing that recovery on an 
implied contract was not possible, imposed on tne defendant a direct 
legal obligation not sounding in contract but in restitution. Rand J. said:
T h ere  rem ains the question o f recovery fo r the services rendered on a 
quantum meruit. On the findings o f both C ourts below  the services 
w ere not given g ra tu itou sly  but on the footing  o f a contractu al re la ­
tion : they were to be paid for. T h e  statu te  in such a case does not 
touch the p rin cip le  o f restitu tion  against what w ould  otherw ise be 
an u n ju st enrichm ent o f the defend ant at the expense o f the p la in tiff.
T h is is exem p lified  in the sim ple case o f p art o r fu ll paym ent in 
m oney as the price un d er an ora l contract: it w ould  be in eq uitab le  
to a llow  the prom isor to keep both the land and the m oney and  
the o th e r p arty  to the bargain is en titled  to recover w hat he has paid. 
S im ila rly  is it in the case o f services given. T h is m atter is e laborated  
exh au stive ly  in the Restatement of the I.aiv of Contract issued by the  
A m erican Law In stitu te  and Professor W illis to n ’s m onum ental work  
on Contracts, 1936, vo l. 2, s. 536 deals w ith  the same topic. On the 
princip les there  laid  dow n the respondent is en titled  to recover fo r 
his services and outlays w h at the deceased wotdd have had to pay fo r  
them  on a p u re ly  business basis to any o th e r person in the position  
o f the respondent.21»
Cartwright J. shared this opinion:
I agree w ith  the conclusion o f m y b ro th e r R and th at the respondent 
is en titled  to recover the va lu e  o f these services from  the respondent 
ad m in istrato r. T h is  right appears to m e to be based, not on the con­
tract. but on an ob ligation  im posed by lavv.so
He also said:
In the case at bar, a ll the acts fo r w hich the respondent asks to be 
paid un der his a lte rn a tiv e  claim  w ere c learly  done in perform ance  
of the existing but un en forceab le  contract w ith the deceased that she 
w ou ld  devise f>48 Besserer St. to h im , and to in fe r fro m  them  a fresh  
contract to pay the va lu e  on the services in m oney w ould  be, in the  
w ords o f B rett L. J . in Britain v. Rossiter (1879) 11 Q.B.D. 123, 
to draw  an in ference con trary  to the fact.3 l
25. 119431 A C. 32. at p. 55.
26\ 11951) A.C. 507.
27. Ibid, p. 513.
28. In Re D iplock'« Estate, D lplock V. W tntle, [1948] Ch. 465, at p. 480, the Court of 
Appeal regarded it as clearly established that the right to recover money paid 
under a mistake of fact is founded on an implied promise to pay.
29. 11954 1 3 D.L.R. 788.
30. Ibid. p. 794.
31. Ibid. p. 795.
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Canadian Courts mav now be at liberty to provide remedies in cases 
where actions in tort, contract, or trust would not be available. The 
Dcglman case demonstrates a categorv of claims, the essential prin­
ciple of which is that the defendant should not be unjustly enriched at 
the expense of the plaintiff. The test of the recovery is not the 
loss to the plaintiff, but the gain to the defendant, though in gen­
eral the loss fixes a lim it. The essence of the remedy in other words 
is not compensation to the plaintiff, but the restitution by the defend­
ant of what would be, if not restored, an unjust enrichment. Since the 
obligation is one for the refund of enrichment as distinguished from 
damages, the obligation ceases where the enrichment ceases.
—Joseph Berube, 1 Law, U.N.B.
PROVINCIAL BANK OF CANADA V. W F T M O R F ' 
Capias Practice
This decision affords an opportunity to examine the practicc on issu­
ance of a writ of capias and more particularly the requirements of the 
affidavit in support of an application for an order to hold to bail. The 
judgment turns on the lack of validity of the affidavit and the main 
concern here shall be with that.
The facts of this case are simple. Application was made for an 
order to be at libertv to issue a capias against the defendant. The af­
fidavit in support of the application was made by the assistant manager 
of the plaintiff bank. The order was granted and a capias issued. 'I lie  
defendant was arrested and later released on bail bond. The defendant 
then made application to have the proceedings set aside because of 
certain irregularities.
The statutory authorization for capias proceedings is found in s. 
1 (2) of the Arrest and Examinations Act2 as follows:
A ny person, not having privilege, may he arrested and held to bail, 
o r com m itted  to prison on mesne process, un d er the fo llow ing  
circum stances:
W h ere  in an action brought o r to be brought in any court having  
ju risd ic tion , a person by a ffid av it o f h im self o r some o th e r person  
shows to the satisfaction o f the judge o r o th er o ffic ia l h ere in after  
m entioned, that he has a cause o f action against another person to an  
am oun t exceeding tw enty d o llars, and also shows such facts and  
circum stances as satisfy the judge, o r o th e r o ffic ia l, that there is 
good cause fo r believing that the person against whom  the app lication  
is m ade is about to q u it the province, the judge o r o th er o ffic ia l may 
o rd er that the person against whom  the app lication  is made shall be 
arrested , in which event a w rit o f capias may be issued to arrest 
such person in such m an ner as has hereto fore  been the practice.
The following objections were made to the affidavit:
(1) The affidavit did not state the amount of the alleged cause 
of action.
1. Saint John County Court, Keirstead, Co. Ct. J ., 11954] 3 D.L.R. 70; 35 M.P.R. 107
2. R.S.N.B. 1952, C. 10.
